![]() Russian tanks, especially old ones, are also being used as indirect fire artillery. The notable recent exception to that support-oriented role was Russia’s disastrous winter offensive targeting Vuhledar, where massed Russian armor assaults repeatedly smashed themselves to pieces against robust, prepared Ukrainian anti-tank defenses-including pre-sighted artillery, mines, kamikaze FPV drones and anti-tank guided missiles-leading to the effective destruction of Russia’s 155 th Naval Infantry Brigades. At that distance, Russian tankists use their optics to spot enemy positions and destroy them with direct main gun fire. The primary mission is now observed to be direct fire support by tanks situated 1.2 miles (2 kilometers) from Ukrainian positions, outside the reach of shorter-range anti-tank weapons. The RUSI report states that after the early war catastrophes, Russian armor is using “significantly evolved” tactics aimed at minimizing losses by keeping them in a supporting role. Tactical Adaptations: Infantry Support and Gunfire Raids The fleet is also receiving old Soviet tanks reactivated from storage, though Russia has only proven able to reactivate a small subset of that stockpile. However, Russia’s fleet is receiving a trickle of newly produced T-90M tanks. ![]() Russia is thought to have had an active fleet of roughly 3,000 tanks when it invaded Ukraine, meaning that it has lost the equivalent of 2/3 of what it started with. However, a May report by the UK’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank clarifies that Russian tankers are now mostly using more cautious tactics supporting infantry, and employing technologies and techniques that implicitly reduce the effectiveness of even highly capable Javelin missiles supplied by the U.S. That count only includes losses individually documented by the Oryx blog-meaning that the actual count is surely higher, considering the losses that didn’t get photographed. This resulted in rapid, catastrophic losses-and contributed to Russia hitting the milestone of 2,001 main battle tanks visually confirmed destroyed, captured, or abandoned by May 30, 2023. ![]() But in a classic tactical error, Russian armor lacked enough escorting infantry to detect and flush out ambushes in built-up areas. These TTPs were included based upon closed reporting on APT actors that are known to target think tanks or based upon CISA incident response data.When Russia launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it aggressively pushed its main battle tanks and lighter, but heavily-armed, BMP and BMD fighting vehicles forward on the offense. policy, CISA and FBI urge individuals and organizations in the international affairs and national security sectors to immediately adopt a heightened state of awareness and implement the critical steps listed in the Mitigations section of this Advisory.Ĭlick here for a PDF version of this report.ĬISA created the following MITRE ATT&CK profile to provide a non-exhaustive list of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by APT actors to break through think tanks’ defenses, conduct reconnaissance in their environments, exfiltrate proprietary or confidential information, and execute effects on targets. Given the importance that think tanks can have in shaping U.S. When successful, these low-effort, high-reward approaches allow threat actors to steal sensitive information, acquire user credentials, and gain persistent access to victim networks. Attackers may leverage virtual private networks (VPNs) and other remote work tools to gain initial access or persistence on a victim’s network. Increased telework during the COVID-19 pandemic has expanded workforce reliance on remote connectivity, affording malicious actors more opportunities to exploit those connections and to blend in with increased traffic. These have included low-effort capabilities such as spearphishing emails and third-party message services directed at both corporate and personal accounts, as well as exploiting vulnerable web-facing devices and remote connection capabilities. think tanks in developing network defense procedures to prevent or rapidly detect these attacks.ĪPT actors have relied on multiple avenues for initial access. This malicious activity is often, but not exclusively, directed at individuals and organizations that focus on international affairs or national security policy. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have observed persistent continued cyber intrusions by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors targeting U.S. See the ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques. This Advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK®) framework.
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